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MATTER OF A-A-: THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS' STATUTORY
MISINTERPRETATION DENIES
DISCRETIONARY RELIEF TO AGGRAVATED
FELONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution contains few examples of
express enumeration of federal powers regarding immigra-
tion matters.' Yet, since 1798, Congress has passed an in-
creasingly complex set of laws2 dealing with the expulsion 3 of
aliens4 whom Congress deems undesirable.5 Numerous
Supreme Court decisions since that time have recognized
that Congress has virtual plenary power to regulate the in-
flux and expulsion of aliens from the United States
territories. 6
1. A summary of these provisions can be found in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 8-11 (Foundation Press, Inc. ed., 1992) (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4
(the Naturalization Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (the War Clause); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (the Migration and Importation Clause)).
2. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has commented that: "Con-
gress, pursuant to its virtually unfettered power to exclude or deport natives of
other countries, and apparently confident of the aphorism that human skill,
properly applied, can resolve any enigma that human inventiveness can create,
has enacted a baffling skein of provisions for the I.N.S. and courts to disentan-
gle." Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
3. Those who have "entered" the country, that is, those who have been in-
spected and admitted, or who have successfully crossed the border surrepti-
tiously, are removed through deportation proceedings. See CHARLES GORDON &
STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAw & PROCEDURE, § 1.03(2)(b) (1992). Indi-
viduals apprehended while attempting to enter the country and thus subjected,
initially or continuously, to official restraint are removed through exclusion pro-
ceedings. Id.
4. The term "alien" in this comment coincides with the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) definition: "[Amny person not a citizen or national of the
United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1988).
5. See CHARLEs GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAw & PRO-
CEDURE, § 71.01 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (stating
that the right of a nation to expel or deport unnaturalized foreigners is absolute
and unqualified); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (stat-
ing that the power to exclude foreigners from the country whenever the govern-
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One group Congress decided deserved such attention was
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. The Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 (ADAA)7 first introduced the term "aggravated
felony" to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA).8 Section 7342 of the ADAA defined an aggravated fel-
ony as murder, drug or firearms trafficking, or any conspir-
acy or attempt to commit such acts.9
The Immigration Act of 1990 (IA90) significantly ex-
panded the definition of aggravated felony. 10 Section 501(a)
of IA90 added specific violent crimes, illicit trafficking in any
controlled substance, and money laundering to the definition
of aggravated felony." Additionally, Section 501(a) extended
the aggravated felony definition to violations of federal and
state law, as well as to certain foreign convictions.' 2
Currently, conviction of an aggravated felony encumbers
an alien with a wide range of disabilities. 13 For example,
pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA, 4 an alien' 5 in deporta-
ment deems necessary is a part of the sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution).
7. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. III 1991)) [hereinafter ADAA].
8. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)) [hereinafter INA].
9. ADAA, supra note 7, § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70.
10. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. III 1991)) [hereinafter IA90].
11. Id. § 501(a)(2), (3), 104 Stat. at 5048.
12. Id. § 501(a)(4), (5), (6), 104 Stat. at 5048.
13. "Disabilities" is used in this comment as a term of art to describe the
unfavorable immigration consequences statutorily imposed by the INA upon
aliens in violation of specified provisions of United States or foreign law.
14. INA, supra note 8, § 212(c), 66 Stat. at 187 (see current version of sec-
tion at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. III 1991)).
15. Section 212(c) of the INA requires that the alien seeking relief be "law-
fully admitted for permanent residence... and... [be] returning to a lawful
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years" in order to qualify. Id.
These two qualifications are not at issue in this comment. Therefore, in order
to avoid unnecessary repetition of these terms, all references to aliens qualify-
ing or applying for 212(c) relief are assumed admitted for lawful permanent
residence and possessed of a lawful unrelinquished domicile in the United
States for seven years.
When an alien is in the deportation process, it is unclear when lawful domi-
cile ends. Compare Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 350, 355 (11th Cir. 1984)
(holding that lawful domicile ends when deportation proceedings begin) with
Lok v. INS, 681 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that lawful domicile ends
when administrative deportation order is final) and Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442,
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tion proceedings,16 already convicted of an aggravated felony
and who has served five years imprisonment, is barred from
seeking a discretionary waiver of deportability from the At-
torney General.' 7 Many statutes barring forms of relief to
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies state when the under-
lying conviction must occur for a disability to attach.' The
bar to relief under section 212(c) of the INA, however, does
not. Thus, it is unclear when the alien's conviction for an ag-
gravated felony must have occurred in order for the alien to
be disqualified from a discretionary waiver of deportability.
This question arose in a case decided by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA)' 9 on May 15, 1992.20 In Matter of
A-A-, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) instituted deportation proceedings against a per-
manent, legal resident alien convicted of murder in 1985.21
Forms of relief from deportation sought by the respondent in-
cluded section 212(c) discretionary relief.22 The presiding im-
migration judge denied relief. The judge believed that the re-
spondent's conviction was not an aggravated felony, as the
1444 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that lawful domicile ends when judicial review of
a deportation order is final).
16. Although § 212(c) of the INA appears on its face to apply only to the
exclusion of aliens, § 212(c) relief is also available in deportation proceedings.
See infra text accompanying notes 101-12.
17. See INA, supra note 8. References throughout this comment to the At-
torney General also include reference to those such as the immigration judges
or the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), who are acting with the authority
delegated to them by the Attorney General pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)
(1988), 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 3.0 (1993).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
19. The BIA reviews appeals from the decisions of immigration judges in
deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1993). The Office of the Chief Immi-
gration Judge and the BIA were created as part of the Executive Office for Im-
migration Review, established by the Attorney General in 1983 to adjudicate
deportation and other immigration matters. 48 Fed. Reg. 8039 (1983); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 3.0, 3.1, 3.9 (1993). While the Supreme Court has interpreted the INA as
exempting deportation hearings from the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955), judicial review of a final deporta-
tion order was originally guaranteed by seeking declaratory judgments or in-
junctions under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1992), in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48, 49-52 (1955). Subsequently, in 1961, Congress created a specific
statutory provision for judicial review, INA, supra note 8, § 106(a), whereby the
alien bypasses the district court and files a petition for review with the federal
circuit court of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
20. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176 (BIA 1992).
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 3. The respondent also sought, but was found ineligible for, asy-
lum and withholding of deportation. Id.
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conviction occurred before the enactment of the ADAA.2
Although the respondent qualified to apply for 212(c) relief,
the judge denied the relief in the exercise of judicial discre-
tion.24 On appeal, the BIA stated that the aggravated felony
definition applied retroactively to all ADAA-defined aggra-
vated felonies, and that as such, the bar to 212(c) relief also
applied to all such convictions.25
Matter of A-A- was the first decision by the BIA to hold
that the aggravated felony definition applied retroactively to
all convictions of ADAA-defined crimes. Therefore, any con-
viction, whether entered before, on, or after enactment of the
ADAA, barred 212(c) relief.26 It is worth noting that the re-
spondent in Matter of A-A- was represented pro se. 27 Thus,
the BIA was not fully briefed on the disputed issues.
This comment analyzes the BIA's decision in Matter of A-
A-. First, Section II of the comment discusses the evolution of
the relevant sections of immigration law, the introduction of
the term "aggravated felony"28 to immigration law, and the
availability of 212(c) relief in deportation proceedings.29
Next, Section II summarizes in detail the BIA's decision in
23. Id. at 4-5.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 18 (BIA 1992).
26. The BIA did note that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted the
temporal applicability of the aggravated felony definition in the context of a bar
of the automatic stay of deportation pending judicial review of a final deporta-
tion order (enacted by IA90, supra note 10, § 513). Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 945
F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1991). Ayala-Chavez held that the definition did not apply
retrospectively to bar an automatic stay pending judicial review in deportation
proceedings. Id. at 293. However, the BIA interpreted the holding of Ayala-
Chavez as superseded by the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991 (MTINA) to IA90 § 513, (relying on
Arthurs v. INS, 959 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1992) and Ignacio v. INS, 955 F.2d 295
(5th Cir. 1992)), which amended IA90 § 513 to apply to convictions entered
"before, or after" November 29, 1990. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat.
1733 (1991) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note (Supp. III 1991))
[hereinafter MTINA. As such, the BIA asserted that "[the Ninth Circuit
Court's] theory of the case [regarding temporal applicability] is now of question-
able validity." Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 13-14 (BIA 1992). At least one
commentator questioned the development's relevance to the validity of the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of temporal applicability of the aggravated felony defi-
nition. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 784-85 (June 29, 1992).
27. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 2.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 39-94.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 97-125.
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Matter of A-A-. 8 ° Section III presents considerations over-
looked by the BIA in the respondent's favor 31 and offers spe-
cific criticisms of the BIA's analysis in Matter of A-A-2 This
comprehensive analysis indicates that a discretionary waiver
of deportability pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA is avail-
able to aggravated felons convicted of ADAA-defined aggra-
vated felonies prior to the date of enactment of the ADAA. 33
Finally, Section IV demonstrates the importance of this is-
sue.34 In the absence of clear statutory authority, the BIA
eliminated the possibility of discretionary relief from deporta-
tion for a large class of aliens.3 5 In addition, the BIA's disre-
gard of precedential decisions in favor of aliens is discussed.36
Section IV also offers a proposal to settle the issue adequately
and thus end further dispute regarding the availability of
212(c) relief in these cases.37
II. BACKGROUND
To better understand the issues in Matter of A-A-, this
section presents a history of the "aggravated felony" concept
in immigration law and the consequences aliens face when
convicted of such offenses. Next, a description of the evolu-
tion of the availability of discretionary relief in deportation
proceedings pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA is provided.
Finally, this section outlines the decision of the BIA in Matter
of A-A-.
A. Introduction and Evolution of the Aggravated Felony in
Immigration Law, and Concomitant Consequences
A relatively recent addition to the INA, the "aggravated
felony" concept is nonetheless deeply embedded in the stat-
utes dealing with the deportation and exclusion of aliens.3 8
Apart from grounds for deportation 39 or exclusion, 40 an ag-
gravated felon is barred from many forms of relief and is sub-
30. See infra text accompanying notes 126-66.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 172-96.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 197-230.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
35. See, e.g., infra note 233 and accompanying text.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 236-38.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 239-44.
38. See infra notes 39-42.
39. INA, supra note 8, § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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ject to sanctions not applicable to other aliens.41 In addition,
an aggravated felon is subject to increased penalties for viola-
tions of provisions applicable to all aliens.42 These disabili-
ties are a result of two acts and one amendment described
below.
1. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) first intro-
duced the term "aggravated felony" to the INA.43 The ADAA
defined an aggravated felony as: "[M]urder, any drug traffick-
ing crime ... or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or de-
structive devices ... or any attempt or conspiracy to commit
any such act, committed within the United States."44 The
ADAA did not provide the effective date for the term.45 The
legislative history behind the ADAA provides no guidance,
because no Senate or House Report was submitted with the
ADAA.46 The ADAA includes, however, provisions enumerat-
ing specific consequences attaching to aliens convicted of ag-
gravated felonies and providing specific terms of temporal ap-
plicability.47 Three sections of the ADAA state that their
provisions apply to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies on
or after the date of enactment of the ADAA. First, section
7343 of the ADAA authorizes the Attorney General to take
into custody aliens convicted of aggravated felonies upon
completion of their sentences 48 and states that such aggra-
vated felons are ineligible for voluntary departure.49 Second,
40. INA, supra note 8, § 1182(a)(2) (providing for exclusion of aliens on
criminal and related grounds). While the term "aggravated felony" is not em-
ployed in this provision, most crimes classified as aggravated felonies are
grounds for deportation or exclusion. See Matter of Meza, Int. Dec. 3146 (BIA
1991).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 48, 49, 71, 75-77, 82, 84.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 51, 52, 54, 72, 83, 85.
43. ADAA, supra note 7, 102 Stat. at 4469-70.
44. Id.
45. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 6 (BIA 1992).
46. ADAA, supra note 7, 102 Stat. at 4181.
47. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 6. "Temporal applicability" is used in
this comment to refer to date-specific language indicating when an action must
occur or condition must be present for statutorily defined consequences to at-
tach. For example, a provision of law that states "this statute will apply to all
aliens convicted of an aggravated felony after November 18, 1988" contains a
term of temporal applicability.
48. ADAA, supra note 7, § 7343(a), 102 Stat. at 4470.
49. Id.
252 [Vol. 34
1993] IMMIGRATION AND AGGRAVATED FELONS 253
section 7344 adds an aggravated felony conviction to grounds
for deportation.5 ° Finally, section 7347 creates expedited de-
portation proceedings for aliens convicted of aggravated felo-
nies.51 Each of these sections applies to aliens convicted of an
aggravated felony after the enactment of the ADAA.
In contrast to the above sections, the temporal applicabil-
ity of three other disability provisions in the ADAA does not
depend on the date of the alien's aggravated felony convic-
tion. Instead, the three provisions focus on the date when an-
other separate act was committed. First, section 7345, which
increased the penalty for premature entry of aggravated
felons after deportation, "appl[ies] to any alien who enters,
attempts to enter, or is found in, the United States on or after
the date of the enactment of [the ADAA]."5 2 Second, section
7346 specifies penalties applicable to anyone who aids or as-
sists aggravated felons to enter the country and is applicable
to any aid or assistance occurring on or after enactment of the
ADAA.53 Finally, section 7349 increases the bar to re-entry
to the United States for aggravated felons and is applicable to
any alien convicted of an aggravated felony seeking admis-
sion to the United States on or after enactment of the
ADAA.54 Thus, at the enactment of the ADAA, each amend-
ment with a disabling provision included a term of temporal
applicability. None of these amendments, however, clearly
indicate when a conviction must occur in order for the aggra-
vated felony definition to be applicable.
2. The Immigration Act of 1990
The consequences to aliens convicted of aggravated felo-
nies, as well as the definition of "aggravated felony" itself,
were greatly expanded by the Immigration Act of 1990
(IA90).55 When enacting the IA90, Congress was concerned
50. Id. § 7344, 102 Stat. at 4470-71.
51. Id. § 7347, 102 Stat. at 4471-72. The ADAA allows initiation of deporta-
tion proceedings while a convicted alien is incarcerated. However, due to the
wording of INA section 212(c), an alien cannot be barred from 212(c) relief until
he or she has served five years of prison time. INS promptness in initiating
deportation proceedings or the likelihood that the alien will serve the required
five years pursuant to the underlying sentence are not relevant to the statutory
requirement. Matter of Ramirez-Somera, Int. Dec. 3185, at 4 (BIA 1992).
52. ADAA, supra note 7, § 7345, 102 Stat. at 4471.
53. Id. § 7346, 102 Stat. at 4471.
54. Id. § 7349, 102 Stat. at 4473.
55. IA90, supra note 10, 104 Stat. at 4978.
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about the number of criminal aliens present in this country56
and the inability to provide for their summary deportation.57
Congress felt that aliens and their attorneys were taking ad-
vantage of the legal system by delaying deportation proceed-
ings on meritless grounds.5 "
As a result of these concerns, the IA90 both expanded the
definition of aggravated felony and increased the disabilities
for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. In terms of vio-
lent crimes, the aggravated felony definition was previously
limited to murder or attempted murder.59 Section 501 of the
IA90 expanded the definition to include, in addition to mur-
der, "any crime of violence ( ... not including a purely polit-
ical offense) for which the term of imprisonment imposed (re-
gardless of any suspension of such imprisonment) is at least
[five] years."60 This change was not based on a concern over
violent crime in general, but rather to target crimes of vio-
lence involving drug-related offenses.61
In addition to expanding the list of violent crimes, the
IA90 greatly expanded the range of drug offenses within the
56. H.R. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 145 (1990). ("The
Committee is deeply disturbed that INS has not placed a higher priority on the
criminal alien problem .... The Committee is convinced that among the classes
of aliens deserving of deportation no class should receive greater attention than
aliens convicted of serious criminal offenses.").
57. Id. ("Although the budget authority of INS in FY 1989 exceeded $1 bil-
lion, less than $50 million was expended on investigating, detaining, and de-
porting criminal aliens."). See also 136 CONG. REC. H8630 (daily ed. Oct. 2,
1990) ("[Tlhere have been only 22,000 aliens deported in the last 3 years out of
1.5 to 2 million that were eligible to be deported. From the time of apprehen-
sion, through the judge's decision and then through all the appeals the process
can take years." (statement of Rep. James H. Quillen (R-Tenn)).
58. See 136 CONG. REC. S17109 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) ("The bill restruc-
tures our deportation procedures to bring them more in line with our Nation's
rules of civil procedure. We were in a situation in deportation where the depor-
tees had more due process than did an American citizen." (statement of Sen.
Alan K Simpson (R-Wyo)).
59. See supra text accompanying note 44.
60. IA90, supra note 10, § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. at 5048. Section 16 of Title
18 defines a crime of violence as an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or prop-
erty of another, or any other felony that which by its nature involves a substan-
tial risk of the use of force against a person or property of another. 18 U.S.C.
§ 16 (1992).
61. See 136 CONG. REC. S6603 (daily ed. May 18, 1990) ("The need for this
expansion of the term is to capture those egregious crimes of violence that are
often concomitant with drug related crimes. This provision would ... include
crimes of physical force or threatened physical force.., which are so often asso-
ciated with drug crimes.").
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aggravated felony definition. Previously limited to enumer-
ated "drug trafficking crimes,"62 the IA90 added to the defini-
tion "any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance (as de-
fined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act)."63
Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act defines the term
"controlled substance" with an exhaustive list of narcotics
and other chemical compounds.64 Thus, all "illicit traffick-
ing" offenses involving controlled substances are now within
the ADAA list of "drug trafficking crimes" and, upon convic-
tion, label the alien an aggravated felon.65
The IA90 also increased the scope of the aggravated fel-
ony definition by adding new classes of crimes not previously
included. Money-laundering crimes are now included in the
definition.66 Also, Congress codified a BIA decision67 declar-
ing that the aggravated felony definition included, in addition
to federal law, crimes committed under state law.68 Addition-
ally, the decision included within the aggravated felony defi-
nition "offenses ... in violation of foreign law for which the
62. See supra text accompanying note 41.
63. IA90, supra note 10, § 501(a)(2), 104 Stat. at 5048.
64. The term "controlled substance" includes any substance which appears
in one of five comprehensive schedules. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1992).
65. This explanation of what drug offenses constitute an aggravated felony
is rather general, especially considering that the IA90 codified the BIA's deci-
sion in Matter of Barrett to include analogous state law offenses in the defini-
tion. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68. Fortunately, the BIA addressed
this issue, explaining:
[W]here a state, federal, or qualified foreign conviction is a felony and
involves [unlawful trading or dealing] ... in any controlled substance
as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, a finding of
aggravated felony is proper .... However, if the offense is not desig-
nated as a felony it may nonetheless be [an aggravated felony] if it is
analogous to an offense punishable under one of the federal acts speci-
fied ... and the offense to which it is analogous is a "felony" under
federal law.... [Additionally], certain offenses which do not obviously
[involve unlawful trading or dealing in controlled substances] might
nonetheless be [aggravated felonies] .... [A]ny federal [drug] convic-
tion ... which is a felony, or pursuant to Barrett any federal, state, [or]
specified foreign conviction analogous to such conviction [is also an ag-
gravated felony].
Matter of Davis, Int. Dec. 3181, at 11 (BIA 1992).
66. IA90, supra note 10, § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. at 5048.
67. Matter of Barrett, Int. Dec. 3131 (BIA 1990). See also H.R. REP. No.
681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 147 (1990) ("[T]he Committee concurs with
[Barrett] and wishes to end further litigation on this issue.").
68. IA90, supra note 10, § 501(a)(5), 104 Stat. at 5048.
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term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15
years."69 Thus, the INA now states:
The term "aggravated felony" means murder, any illicit
trafficking in any controlled substance (as defined in sec-
tion 802 of Title 21), including any drug trafficking crime
as defined in section 924(c)(2) of Title 18, or any illicit
trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices as de-
fined in section 921 of such title, any offense described in
section 1956 of Title 18 (relating to laundering of mone-
tary instruments), or any crime of violence (as defined in
section 16 of Title 18, not including a purely political of-
fense) for which the term of imprisonment imposed (re-
gardless of any suspension of such imprisonment) is at
least 5 years, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any
such act. Such term applies to offenses described in the
previous sentence whether in violation of Federal or State
law and also applies to offenses described in the previous
sentence in violation of foreign law for which the term of
imprisonment was completed within the previous 15
years.7 °
As mentioned previously, the IA90 dramatically in-
creased the range of disabilities imposed on aliens convicted
of aggravated felonies. Of particular significance is that the
discretionary waiver of deportability contained in section
212(c) was rendered unavailable to "an alien who has been
convicted of an aggravated felony and has served a term of
imprisonment of at least 5 years."71 In addition, the IA90: (1)
shortened the period during which an aggravated felon may
petition a federal court of appeal to review a final deportation
order from sixty to thirty days;72 (2) clarified the law concern-
ing mandatory INS detention of aggravated felons upon re-
lease from custody;73 (3) included similar change regarding
the detention of aggravated felons in exclusion proceedings; 74
(4) eliminated the ability of an aggravated felon to avoid de-
69. Id. § 501(a)(6), 104 Stat. at 5048.
70. INA, supra note 8, § 101(a)(43).
71. IA90, supra note 10, § 511(a), 104 Stat. at 5052. This provision was
later amended to allow for the aggregation of multiple sentences. See infra text
accompanying note 90.
72. Id. § 502(a), 104 Stat. at 5048. This applies to final deportation orders
issued on or after January 1, 1991. Id.
73. Id. § 504(a), 104 Stat. at 5049-50. Effective upon enactment of the
IA90, November 29, 1990. Id.
74. Id. § 504(b), 104 Stat. at 5050. Effective upon enactment of the IA90,
November 29, 1990. Id.
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portation by presidential or gubernatorial pardon;75 (5) elimi-
nated the ability of a trial judge or prosecutor to request the
deportation of the aggravated felon before completion of the
sentence;76 (6) dictated that any alien aggravated felon
lacked "good moral character"77 and was thus precluded from
such benefits as voluntary departure,78 suspension of depor-
tation,79 registry,80 and naturalization;81 (7) eliminated the
automatic stay of deportation pending judicial review for
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies; 2 (8) lengthened the
ban for re-entry of aggravated felons subsequent to deporta-
tion from ten to twenty years; 3 (9) barred aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies from applying for, or being granted, asy-
lum;"4 and (10) declared that for the purpose of a withhold-
ing deportation, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are
considered to have committed particularly serious crimes.8 5
75. Id. § 506(a), 104 Stat. at 5050. Effective upon enactment of the IA90,
November 29, 1990. Id.
76. Id. § 505(a), 104 Stat. at 5050. Effective upon enactment of the IA90,
November 29, 1990. IA90. Id.
77. Id. § 509(a), 104 Stat. at 5051. Effective upon enactment of the IA90,
November 29, 1990, and applicable to convictions occurring on or after such
date. Id.
78. INA, supra note 8, § 1254(e)(1).
79. Id. § 1254(a)(1).
80. Id. § 1259.
81. Id. § 1427(a).
82. IA90, supra note 10, § 513(a), 104 Stat. at 5052. Effective for petitions
to review filed more than 60 days after enactment of the IA90. Id.
83. Id. § 514(a), 104 Stat. at 5053. Effective upon admissions occurring on
or after January 1, 1991. Id.
84. Id. Applies to applications made on or after enactment of the IA90, No-
vember 29, 1990. Id.
85. Id. Effective upon enactment of the IA90, November 29, 1990. Id. The
effect of this statute is the subject of an ongoing controversy. The position of
the BIA is that an alien who has committed a "particularly serious crime" in the
context of an 8 U.S.C. § 1253 application for withholding of deportation a priori
is a danger to the community and is thus ineligible for withholding of deporta-
tion. Matter of K-, Int. Dec. 3163 (BIA 1991). However, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (D-Mass.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refu-
gee Affairs, and a sponsor of the IA90, stated in a letter to David Milhollan,
Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, that there was a mis-
understanding or misinterpretation regarding IA90 § 515. In that letter, Sena-
tor Kennedy notes:
[W]e clearly stated that aggravated felons "may not apply for or be
granted asylum," [and that w]hile we had the option of making a simi-
lar statement regarding withholding of deportation . . . we rejected
that option ... [and] deliberately left undisturbed the responsibility of
the Attorney General to determine whether such an alien also "consti-
tutes a danger to the community of the United States."
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3. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991
The final relevant amendment to the INA is the Miscella-
neous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments of 1991 (MTINA).8 6 Principally enacted to cor-
rect technical errors in the IA90, the MTINA also included "a
number of technical amendments."8 7 The MTINA amended
the definition of aggravated felony to correct a typographical
error."" In addition, some important changes were made.
Previously, section 212(c) stated that an alien was ineligible
for 212(c) relief where the alien was convicted of an aggra-
vated felony and served more than five years of incarcera-
tion. 9 The MTINA amended the language that barred 212(c)
relief for aggravated felons to allow for the aggregation of
time served pursuant to separate aggravated felony convic-
tions.9 ° Thus, where previously an alien needed to be con-
victed of a crime serious enough to warrant a sentence of five
years' imprisonment to bar 212(c) relief, multiple convictions
of lesser offenses that result in five years' imprisonment are
now sufficient to disqualify an alien from such relief.
Additionally, the MTINA made important changes to the
provisions of the IA90 that bar aggravated felons from auto-
matic stays of deportation pending judicial review," availa-
bility of asylum,92 and withholding of deportation.9 3 The
IA90 previously omitted explicit language regarding when
the conviction must occur for these disabilities to attach. The
MTINA amended these sections of the IA90 to apply to con-
victions for aggravated felonies entered "before, on, or after
the date" of their effectiveness.94
Letter from Sen. Kennedy dated April 16, 1991, reprinted in 69 INTERPRETER
RELEASES, 570-71, App. IV. (May 14, 1992).
86. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amend-
ments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note (Supp. III 1991)) [hereinafter MTINA].
87. H.R. REP. No. 102-383, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1991).
88. MTINA, supra note 86, § 306(a)(1), 105 Stat. at 1751. (which substi-
tuted a period for ",." after "commit any such act").
89. IA90, supra note 10, § 511(a), 104 Stat. at 5052.
90. MTINA, supra note 86, § 306(a)(10), 105 Stat. at 1751.
91. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
94. MTINA, supra note 86, §§ 306(11)(B), 306(13), 105 Stat. at 1751-52.
Section 306(11)(B) states that it shall apply to aggravated felony convictions
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With the explanation of the dramatic expansion of the
aggravated felony definition and its consequences complete,
this comment next focuses on section 212(c) of the INA.
B. Availability of Discretionary Relief Pursuant to Section
212(c) of the INA in Deportation Proceedings
Section 212(c) of the INA authorizes the discretionary re-
lief sought by the respondent in Matter of A-A-.95 The discus-
sion below encompasses the introduction of section 212(c) to
immigration law and its evolution to current application for
aggravated felons in deportation proceedings.
1. Introduction to Immigration Law
Since 1917, the Attorney General has had the authority
to permit the re-entry of aliens otherwise excludable from the
United States.96 This authority is now provided in section
212(c) of the INA. The predecessor of section 212(c) was the
Seventh Proviso of Section 3 of the Immigration Act of
1917, 97 which read: "[A]liens returning after a temporary ab-
sence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven
consecutive years may be admitted in the discretion of the
Attorney General, and under such conditions as he may pre-
scribe."98 When the INA was enacted in 1952, section 212(c)
was added to provide a means of discretionary authority for
the Attorney General comparable to the old law:99
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who
temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under
an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may
be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General
without regard to the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)). Nothing
"entered before, on, or after" enactment of the IA90. Id. § 306(11)(B), 105 Stat.
at 1751. Section 306(13) amends two sections of the IA90 to apply to "convic-
tions entered before, on, or after" the enactment of the IA90. Id. § 306(13), 105
Stat. at 1752. It does not necessarily follow that these sections attach to convic-
tions entered before the creation of the aggravated felony definition. Cf. id.
§ 306(a)(7), 105 Stat. at 1751 (attaching disability to murder convictions "re-
gardless of the date of conviction").
95. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176 at 14 (BIA 1992).
96. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
97. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1976).
98. Immigration Law of 1917, Pub. L. No. 161, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
99. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1653 (1952).
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contained in this subsection shall limit the authority of
the Attorney General to exercise the discretion vested in
him under section 1181(b) of this title. The first sentence
of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been
convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has
served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment
of at least 5 years.' 00
2. Expansion to Deportation Proceedings
Facially, the Seventh Proviso of Section 3 of the Immi-
gration Act of 1917 and section 212(c) of the INA appears to
apply only to aliens in exclusion proceedings. 10 1 Nonetheless,
the history of the application of these provisions reveals fre-
quent expansion as basis for relief in deportation proceedings
where an alien had at some point left the country. 102 This
expansion was typically based on a recognition of the unfair-
ness in providing a form of relief to aliens trying to reapply
for admission while denying that form of relief to aliens who
had re-entered the country. 10 3
A comprehensive expansion of 212(c) relief to aliens in
deportation proceedings occurred in 1976 in the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision in INS v. Francis.0 4 In Fran-
cis, the court declared that providing relief to aliens who had
temporarily left the country, while denying relief to aliens in
similar circumstances who had never left, violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and con-
flicted with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
because it was unrelated to any legitimate governmental in-
terest.1 5 Following Francis, the BIA adopted similar reason-
ing in Matter of Silva, 10 6 declaring that "it is our position that
no distinction shall be made between permanent resident
100. INA, supra note 8, § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1992).
101. An exclusion proceeding is the hearing determining whether an alien
who has not been lawfully admitted to the United States and who has been
detained by the INS prior to gaining entry into the United States may be al-
lowed to legally enter. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1992).
102. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing ex-
pansion of the discretionary waiver of excludability).
103. See, e.g., Matter of L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 5 (BIA 1940); Matter of G-A-, 7 I.
& N. Dec. 274-75 (BIA 1956).
104. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
105. Id. at 272-73.
106. 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976).
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aliens who temporarily proceed abroad and nondeparting
permanent resident aliens."' °7
The extent to which 212(c) relief may be extended to
aliens in deportation proceedings was clarified by subsequent
decisions. The BIA ruled that 212(c) may not be invoked to
waive all grounds of deportability.108 Only when an alien's
behavior is a ground for exclusion °9 or grounds substantially
equivalent to grounds of excludability" may deportation be
waived pursuant to 212(c). The limited availability of 212(c)
relief was recently confirmed when the Attorney General"'
overturned a BIA decision to extend 212(c) to all grounds of
deportation in Matter of Hernandez-Casillas. "2
3. Applicability to Aggravated Felons
The availability of 212(c) relief to aggravated felons has
been the subject of recent administrative decisions by the
BIA. In Matter of Meza, 1 the respondent, convicted of an ag-
gravated felony, challenged an immigration judge's decision
that 212(c) relief was unavailable because commission of an
aggravated felony is not grounds for inadmissibility." 4 The
BIA noted that since the aggravated felony definition "refers
to several types or categories of offenses . . . [that] clearly
could also form the basis for excludability under section
212(a)(23), [the respondent] is not precluded from establish-
ing eligibility for section 212(c) relief based on his conviction
for an aggravated felony."1 ' 5 Additionally, the BIA deter-
mined that the legislative history of the IA90 demonstrated
that 212(c) relief was available to aggravated felons," 6 and
quoted the Congressional Record, which stated, "[s]ection
107. Id. at 30.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
109. See Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (BIA 1979).
110. See Matter of Salmon, 16 I. & N. Dec. 734, 736 (BIA 1978).
111. While the Attorney General delegated authority for adjudicating these
cases to the immigration judges and the BIA, decisions by the BIA may be re-
viewed by the Attorney General upon certification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)
(1992).
112. Int. Dec. 3147 (BIA 1990, AG 1991).
113. Int. Dec. 3146 (BIA 1991).
114. Id. at 2.
115. Matter of Meza, Int. Dec. 3146, at 4-5 (BIA 1991). Further, the INA
section 1182(a)(23) was revised and redesignated as §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and
1182(a)(2)(C) by § 601 of the IA90. See IA90, supra note 10, 104 Stat. at 5067-
68.
116. Matter of Meza, Int. Dec. 3146, at 3.
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212(c) provides relief from exclusion and by court decision
from deportation .... This discretionary relief is obtained by
numerous excludable and deportable aliens, including aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies." 117
Section 212(c) relief is not indiscriminately granted upon
a showing of eligibility, but is a discretionary matter within
the purview of the Attorney General."' There must be "a
balancing of the social and humane considerations presented
in an alien's favor against the adverse factors evidencing his
undesirability as a permanent resident."" 9 Favorable con-
siderations may include family ties within the United States,
residence of long duration in this country, evidence of hard-
ship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs, ser-
vice in this country's armed forces, evidence of value and ser-
vice to the community, proof of a genuine rehabilitation, and
other evidence attesting to good character. 20 Negative fac-
tors may include the nature and circumstances of the under-
lying offense, the presence of additional significant violations
of the United States immigration laws, existence of a crimi-
nal record, and other evidence of bad character or undesir-
ability as a permanent resident.12 The commission of an ag-
gravated felony is an adverse factor for aliens hoping for
212(c) relief. Aggravated felons may, however, demonstrate
equities compelling a grant of relief, and they are not re-
quired to make heightened showings merely because the un-
derlying offense meets the aggravated felony definition. 22
Nevertheless, an alien convicted of an aggravated felony
may have difficulty convincing the Attorney General that a
grant of discretionary relief is appropriate. The conviction of
a violent crime or serious drug offense ordinarily requires a
showing of unusual or outstanding circumstances in order to
warrant discretionary relief pursuant to 212(c).' 23 Addition-
ally, some showing of rehabilitation is usually required. 24
117. Id. (citing 136 CONG. REC. S6586, S6604 (daily ed. May 18, 1990)).
118. Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582-83 (BIA 1978).
119. Matter of Roberts, Int. Dec. 3148, at 7 (BIA 1991).
120. See id.; see also Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584-85.
121. Matter of Roberts, Int. Dec. 3148 at 7-8; Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec.
at 584.
122. Matter of Roberts, Int. Dec. 3148 at 9.
123. See Matter of Edwards, Int. Dec. 3134, at 7 (BIA 1990); Matter of Bus-
cemi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 628, 633 (BIA 1988).
124. Matter of Edwards, Int. Dec. 3134 at 8; Matter of Buscemi, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 635.
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While it is difficult for an incarcerated alien to satisfactorily
demonstrate rehabilitation, incarceration will not prevent
the BIA or immigration judge from considering rehabilitation
as a discretionary factor.' 25 Discretionary relief pursuant to
212(c) is available to an aggravated felon in deportation pro-
ceedings; an alien, however, will have a difficult time demon-
strating that such relief is warranted in his or her particular
case.
With the introduction of the aggravated felony definition
to the INA and the evolution of section 212(c) fully explained,
it is now possible to examine the BIA's decision in Matter of
A-A- regarding the availability of 212(c) relief to aliens con-
victed of aggravated felonies who serve five years'
imprisonment.
C. Matter of A-A-
1. Background
In Matter of A-A-, the BIA considered whether an alien
convicted of an ADAA-defined aggravated felony prior to the
enactment of the ADAA and who has served five years in
prison was ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation
pursuant to Section 212(c). 126 The respondent in Matter of A-
A- was a forty-eight-year-old citizen and native of El Salva-
dor. 127 He was admitted to the United States as a lawful per-
manent resident on May 7, 1982.128 The respondent was con-
victed of murder on June 20, 1985 in Texas and sentenced to
twenty years in prison with credit for 185 days served.129 On
November 28, 1988, during his incarceration, the INS initi-
ated deportation proceedings against the respondent. 130 Dur-
ing three deportation hearings conducted in 1991, it was un-
disputed that the respondent was subject to deportation
based on commission of a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years after his date of entry to the
United States.131
125. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 588 (BIA 1978).
126. Int. Dec. 3176 (BIA 1992) (decided May 15, 1992).
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Formerly 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4), it was recodified as § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) by
§ 602(a) of the IA90. IA90, supra note 10, 104 Stat. at 5077.
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The immigration judge determined the respondent, as a
result of his criminal conviction, was ineligible for both asy-
lum and withholding of deportation. 132 The judge, however,
permitted the respondent to apply for a waiver of de-
portability pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA. 133 The INS
contended that the respondent was ineligible for 212(c) relief
due to conviction of an aggravated felony and more than five
years served in prison.13 4 The immigration judge determined
that since the conviction was entered before enactment of the
ADAA, it was not an aggravated felony and thus did not
render the respondent ineligible for 212(c) relief. 35 Nonethe-
less, on September 13, 1991, the judge denied respondent re-
lief and ordered his deportation to El Salvador. 136
The respondent appealed the decision to the BIA, and on
May 15, 1992, the BIA dismissed the appeal.1 37 The BIA, un-
like the immigration judge, found the respondent ineligible
for 212(c) relief. The BIA determined that despite the fact
that the respondent's conviction was entered prior to enact-
ment of the ADAA, he would nonetheless be labeled an aggra-
vated felon and was thus ineligible for 212(c) relief.' 38
2. BIA's Decision and Analysis
a. The Aggravated Felony Definition Attaches to
Pre-ADAA Convictions
The BIA began by considering whether criminal convic-
tions entered before enactment of the ADAA could be labeled
aggravated felonies. The BIA determined that, as is the case
in all questions of statutory construction, the starting point of
its analysis would be the statute itself, with the assumption
that legislative purpose is expressed in the ordinary meaning
of the words chosen by Congress.1 39 As the court noted, how-
ever, the ADAA definition for aggravated felony did not ex-
plicitly state the date on which a conviction must have oc-
curred for the definition to attach. 40 The BIA next stated
132. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 4 (BIA 1992).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3.
137. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 3 (BIA 1992).
138. Id. at 4-5.
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id. at 6.
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that the ADAA attached specific consequences to aliens con-
victed of aggravated felonies, and declared that these provi-
sions showed "by necessary implication" that the definition
applied retroactively to convictions entered before enactment
of the ADAA. 141
According to the BIA's decision, three provisions of the
ADAA indicated that the aggravated felony definition applied
retroactively, as any other interpretation would render these
provisions inapplicable to anyone on the date of enact-
ment.142 Section 7345 of the ADAA, which enhanced the pen-
alties for premature reentry of aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies, applied to "any alien who enters, attempts to enter,
or is found in, the United States on or after the date of enact-
ment of [the ADAA]"1 4 Section 7346 of the ADAA, which
broadened the class of persons subject to criminal sanctions
to include those who aid or assist entry of aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies to the United States, applied to "any aid
or assistance which occurs on or after [November 18,
1988]."' 44 Section 7349 of the ADAA, which increased the bar
to entry after deportation for aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies from five to ten years, was applicable to any aggra-
vated felon "who seeks admission to the United States on or
after the date of the enactment of [the ADAA]."1 45 The BIA
reasoned that these provisions implicitly recognized convic-
tions occurring before the date of enactment, as it would be
virtually impossible for the provisions to apply to anyone on
the date of enactment of the ADAA if the disabilities did not
attach to pre-ADAA convictions.1 46 For example, in the ab-
sence of retroactive application of the aggravated felony defi-
nition, section 7345 of the ADAA could not be applied to an
alien on the date of its enactment unless the alien was caught
entering the United States illegally as well as being convicted
of an aggravated felony on the first day of the statute's
effectiveness.
Next, the BIA noted that three other provisions - sec-
tion 7344, rendering aggravated felons deportable; 147 section
141. Id.
142. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 6-8 (BIA 1992).
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id. at 7-8.
146. Id. at 6-8.
147. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 8 (BIA 1992).
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7343, mandating detention of aggravated felons pending de-
portation; 148 and section 7347, implementing expedited de-
portation proceedings for aggravated felons 149 - were all ap-
plicable to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies on or after
the date of enactment of the ADAA.'5 0 Thus, the BIA as-
serted that Congress' inclusion of the language indicated an
intent for retroactive effect of the aggravated felony defini-
tion.' 5 1 If this were not the case, stated the BIA, it would be
redundant to specifically state in these provisions that they
applied to convictions entered after the enactment of the
ADAA. 152 Additionally, the BIA declared that these provi-
sions demonstrated Congress knew how to limit retroactive
application, indicating Congress could have limited the ag-
gravated felony definition in this manner had it wished to do
so.
15 3
Thus, the BIA stated, under the ADAA, a crime meeting
the aggravated felony criteria set forth in section 7342 of the
INA (an "ADAA aggravated felony") is a proscribed aggra-
vated felony no matter when conviction occurred.15 4 The BIA
noted, however, that each of the specific disabling provisions
included an effective date.'5 5 Therefore, the BIA concluded
that, while an ADAA aggravated felony is defined as an ag-
gravated felony regardless of the date of conviction, its immi-
gration consequence is determined by the effective date of the
specific disabling provision.' 56 Furthermore, the BIA contin-
ued, unless Congress explicitly states otherwise, those provi-
sions are interpreted to include all such convictions, regard-
less of when the conviction occurred. 157
The BIA then contrasted the interpretation regarding ag-
gravated felonies as defined by the ADAA with the criminal
grounds added to the aggravated felony definition by the
IA90 (the "IA90 aggravated felonies"). The IA90 provides
that convictions of the enumerated crimes of money-launder-
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 8-9.
151. Id. at 13.
152. Id. at 9-10.
153. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 10 (BIA 1992).
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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ing, nonpolitical crimes of violence, and certain crimes in vio-
lation of foreign laws are considered aggravated felonies
"only if committed on or after the date of enactment of [the
1990] Act."' 5 s In addition to this limiting language, the BIA
noted that the temporally unlimited language of the original
ADAA aggravated felony definition was not amended. 159 The
BIA determined that these facts supported the conclusion
that if Congress intended to limit the retroactive application
of the aggravated felony definition, it would have done so as it
did in the IA90, or it would have made a conforming amend-
ment in the IA90.
b. The Bar to 212(c) Relief Applies to Pre-ADAA
Convictions
After this determination, the BIA examined the availa-
bility of 212(c) relief for the respondent. 160 The BIA noted
that the IA90 amended section 212(c) of the INA to render
ineligible aliens convicted of aggravated felonies who serve a
five-year term of imprisonment. 16 1 This section of the IA90
applied to applications for relief entered after the date of en-
actment of the IA90 (November 29, 1990).162 Next, the BIA
noted that this section of the IA90 was amended by the
MTINA, allowing for the aggregation of time served for con-
victions when calculating the five-year standard barring re-
lief to aggravated felons. 163 This amendment was "made ef-
fective as if included in the enactment of [the IA90.]"164
After noting that neither the IA90 nor the MTINA con-
tained any specification regarding when a conviction must oc-
cur to be classified as an aggravated felony for the purpose of
section 212(c), the BIA stated that:
as the aggravated felony definition applies retroactively
- except as it relates to the newest crimes added by the
1990 Act which have their own time limitation - the ag-
158. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 12 (BIA 1992).
159. Id. at 13.
160. Id. at 14-18.
161. Id. at 15 (citing IA90, supra note 10, § 511(a), 104 Stat. at 5052).
162. IA90, supra note 10, § 511(b), 104 Stat. at 5052. The language of
§ 511(b) speaks of "admissions" occurring after the enactment of the IA90. As
used in the IA90, "admissions" applies to all applications for relief pursuant to
§ 212(c), including application to an immigration judge during deportation pro-
ceedings. 56 Fed. Reg. 50033 (1991).
163. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 15 (BA 1992).
164. Id. at 15.
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gravated felony bar of section 212(c) is properly read as
applying to all convictions deemed within the original ag-
gravated felony definition, so long as the application for
relief under section 212(c) is submitted after November
29, 1990.165
Thus, the respondent, convicted of murder (an offense termed
an aggravated felony in the original definition set forth in the
ADAA) and having served more than five years served in
prison, was ineligible to apply for 212(c) relief.166
The examination in Section III reveals the BIA's disre-
gard for relevant judicial and administrative precedents, as
well as a line of reasoning insufficient to support the BIA's
conclusion in Matter of A-A-.
III. ANALYSIS
Before beginning its analysis in Matter of A-A-, the BIA
summarized the immigration judge's interpretation from the
earlier hearing finding the respondent eligible for 212(c) re-
lief.167 The BIA then stated, "[w]e disagree and are thus
presented with an opportunity to address the issue."168 For
the BIA, a better opportunity to address the issue is hard to
imagine, as the respondent in Matter of A-A- was not repre-
sented by counsel. 169
Why the BIA promulgated a standard with nationwide
applicability on an issue of first impression in a case in which
the respondent was not represented cannot be determined
from the record. Further, the decision reveals absolutely no
consideration by the BIA of obvious arguments in the respon-
dent's favor. 70 In fact, the BIA's decision did little more than
165. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 18.
167. Id. at 4-5.
168. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 5 (BIA 1992).
169. Id. at 2.
170. Given the contrary interpretations and criticism of the decision of the
BIA by immigration law commentators, it is hard to imagine that these argu-
ments were all too obscure or unwarranted to justify consideration by the BIA
in its decision. See, e.g., 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 782, 787-88 (June 29, 1992);
(criticizing BIA's interpretation of the plain meaning of the statute, its lack of
recognition of presumption of prospective application, and its failure to inter-
pret ambiguity in deportation statutes in favor of aliens); HELEN A. SKLAR AND
STUART I. FOLINSKY, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT, THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF
1990 HANDBOOK 12-4 (1992) (noting "major flaws" in the BIA's analysis, includ-
ing: BIA ignores presumption of prospective operation, BIA ignores language of
the statute, and INS initially interpreted aggravated felony definition prospec-
1993] IMMIGRATION AND AGGRAVATED FELONS 269
effectuate the legal opinion of the INS General Counsel is-
sued on February 22, 1991.171 Amazingly, the BIA ignored
long-standing principles of statutory construction favorable
to the respondent in Matter of A-A-: the general rule against
retroactive application of statutes unless clearly and explic-
itly providing for such, and the tradition of interpreting im-
migration statutes dealing with deportation in an alien's
favor. The following analysis first focuses on the presump-
tion against retroactivity.
A. Presumption Against Retroactivity
The general rule against interpreting statutes retroac-
tively.7 2 was cited by the Supreme Court as early as the nine-
teenth century,173 and is often stated in very strong terms.
For example, the Supreme Court stated in 1913 that "the
tively); Lory D. Rosenberg, Preparing, Presenting and Appealing 212(c) Cases, 2
INSIDE IMMIGRATION: THE PRACTICE ADVISORY 6, (April 1992) (BIA's interpreta-
tion of the issue "runs contrary to principles of statutory construction"); DAN
KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRA-
TION LAw & CRIMES 7-57 to 7-59 (1992) (interpreting aggravated felony defini-
tion to apply to convictions entered after November 18, 1998 because "common-
sense dictates" that one cannot be convicted of something that did not exist at
time of conviction); IRA J. KURZBAN, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW FOUNDATION,
KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAw SOURCEBOOK 73-74 (1992) (aggravated felony defi-
nition does not apply to convictions entered before November 18, 1988); Rich-
ard Prinz, Deportations for Crime in the Nineties - Who Needs the Aggrava-
tion, in 1991-92 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAw HANDBOOK, VOL II.
ADVANCED Topics, 292, 298 (American Immigration Lawyers Association ed.,
1992) (retroactive application of aggravated felony definition regarding 212(c)
relief is inconsistent with availability of other forms of relief).
171. Legal Opinion of INS General Counsel, dated February 22, 1991, re-
printed in HELEN A. SKLAR AND STUART I. FOLINSKY, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
PROJECT, THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 HANDBOOK A12-1 to A12-8 (1992)
[hereinafter Legal Opinion]. In the Legal Opinion, the General Counsel pro-
vides a rough sketch of the BIA's later decision and primarily relies upon two
facts to support the interpretation of retroactive effect. Id. at 1-2, 5. First, the
ADAA provisions providing sanctions against aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies have little effect on the date of enactment if they are not intended to
ensnare convictions entered prior to enactment of the ADAA. Id. at 1-2. Sec-
ond, § 511 of the IA90 omits reference to a time limitation for application to
aggravated felony convictions. Id. at 5.
172. See CHARLES SUTHERLAND, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 41.04 (4th ed. 1992).
173. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 107 (1801)
(stating that courts generally "struggle hard" against a retroactive construction
of legislation that affects the rights of parties). One legal scholar has traced the
rule's roots from Greek and Roman law through Lord Coke into English and
American common law. Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legisla-
tion: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 775-80 (1936).
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first rule of construction is that legislation must be consid-
ered as addressed to the future, not to the past.""u 4 This rule
governs unless the words of a statute "are so clear, strong,
and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot other-
wise be satisfied."1 75 This rule is uniformly followed by the
federal circuit courts of appea 1 7 6 and was recently reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court in most conclusive terms: "Retroactiv-
ity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments
and administrative rules will not be construed to have retro-
active effect unless their language requires this result.' 77
The presumption against retroactive application of stat-
utes and amendments has been relied upon by the courts in
immigration matters. 178 In fact, the BIA recently employed
this principle by rejecting an alien's attempt to enjoy retroac-
tive application of a statute.179 Just over a year before its
decision in Matter of A-A-, the BIA declared in In re Morris8"
that "[aibsent the special considerations present when a case
is pending and a statute is enacted or changed, the rule is
that statutes and amendments to statutes operate prospec-
tively only." 8 ' In In re Morris, where retroactive application
of the statute would have bolstered the respondent's case, the
BIA employed the statutory canon disfavoring retroactivity in
174. Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards, Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913).
175. United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) (emphasis
added).
176. See, e.g., Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 557
F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Retrospective operation will not be given to a
statute unless such is the manifest intention of the legislature."); Sea-Land Ser-
vice, Inc. v. United States 493 F.2d 1357, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ("The governing
rule, however, is that Congress is presumed to have intended statutes or
amendments to operate prospectively unless there is clear statutory expression
or legislative history to the contrary."); Farmington River Power Co. v. Fed.
Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Absent unequivocal expression
to the contrary, the courts give only prospective application to statutes."); Gib-
bons v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 262 F.2d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 1958) ("[A]
substantive statute will not be construed to operate retroactively unless that
intention has been manifested by clear and unequivocal expression.").
177. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (emphasis
added). See also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,
837 (1990) (citing and approving Bowen).
178. See Del Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1947) ("The law
does not favor the retrospective application of statutes.").
179. See infra text accompanying notes 180-82.
180. A18-416-320 (BIA March 26, 1991) (unpublished decision).
181. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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order to reject the respondent's interpretation. 182 Curiously,
in Matter of A-A-, when the same statutory canon was to the
respondent's benefit, consideration of this long-standing prin-
ciple was absent from the BIA's opinion.
B. Interpreting Deportation Statutes in Aliens' Favor
In addition to the rule favoring prospective interpreta-
tion of statutes, the BIA also ignored the legal tradition of
resolving doubts about deportation statutes in aliens'
favor."3 Although deportation is a civil matter18 4 and is not
"punishment,"85 the courts understand the severity of depor-
tation's impact upon individuals, 8 6 and courts seek to inter-
pret statutes concerning deportation narrowly.' 8 7 The
Supreme Court stated that where deportation statutes are in-
volved, because "the stakes are considerable for the individ-
ual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on [an
alien's] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrow-
est of several possible meanings of the words used."'88 Fur-
ther, the Court has recognized "the long-standing principle of
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes
in favor of the alien.""9 For example, in Costello v. INS, 9 °
where the language of a deportation statute and the absence
of legislative history left the Court doubting the statute's
meaning, the Supreme Court stated that it was "nonetheless
constrained by accepted principles of statutory construction..
to resolve the doubt in favor of the [alien]."' 9 ' Similarly,
182. Id.
183. See GORDON, supra note 3 § 71.01[4][b](1992).
184. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
185. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
186. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) ("[Deportation]
may result . . .in loss of both property and life or all that makes life worth
living."); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) ("Deportation is al-
ways a harsh measure."); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Deporta-
tion is a sanction which in severity surpasses all but the most Draconian crimi-
nal penalties.").
187. See infra text accompanying notes 188-92.
188. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (emphasis added) quoted
in Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964).
189. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added); INS v. Errico, 385
U.S. 214, 225 (1966) ("Even if there were some doubt as to the correct construc-
tion of the statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien").
190. 376 U.S. 120 (1964).
191. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
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this rule of interpretation is employed by the federal circuit
courts of appeal in explicit terms.192
The rule of favoring aliens in matters of statutory inter-
pretation regarding deportation is often used by the BIA. In-
deed, in its second published decision following Matter of
A-A-, the BIA employed this tool to determine whether an at-
tempted firearms offense constituted grounds for deportation,
stating:
[W]e reference ... the canon of statutory interpretation
uniquely applicable to the immigration laws, which re-
quires any doubts in construing those statutes to be re-
solved in favor of the alien due to the potentially drastic
consequences of deportation .... [Therefore, any] remain-
ing questions regarding the intent of Congress ... [are]
decided in favor of the respondent. 193
Matter of A-A- never mentioned this statutory canon. Thus,
the BIA inexplicably failed to weigh an important considera-
tion in the respondent's favor.
The tradition providing for application of deportation
statutes in a manner most favorable to aliens is particularly
relevant when applied to statutes designed to provide relief
for aliens. Section 212(c), designed to allow for "flexibility to
permit worthy ... aliens to continue their relationship with
family members in the U.S," 194 is a statute where this princi-
ple is "especially pertinent."195 Indeed, the history of the ap-
plication of section 212(c) demonstrates that the class of
aliens eligible for relief has been steadily expanded through-
out its existence, primarily through generous readings of the
statute and avoidance of strict interpretation of its applica-
192. See, e.g., Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975) ("It is settled
doctrine that deportation statutes must be construed in favor of the alien.");
United States v. Kershner, 228 F.2d 142, 147 (6th Cir. 1955) ("[If there be
deemed to exist any reasonable doubt as to whether Congress intended to make
an alien deportable, that doubt should be resolved in [the alien's] favor.").
193. Matter of Hou, Int. Dec. 3178, at 12-13 (BIA 1992).
194. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Lok v. INS,
548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing and approving Francis).
195. Lok, 548 F.2d at 39:
The recognition of this principle is especially pertinent in a case where
the alien seeks to avoid deportation through the expedient of Section
212(c), which was enacted by Congress to provide the Attorney General
the flexibility and discretion to permit worthy aliens to continue their
relationships with family members in the [U.S.].
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bility.196 It is difficult to imagine why such an applicable
principle of statutory construction was not even mentioned by
the BIA.
C. The BIA's Analysis Does Not Present Evidence of
Congressional Intent for Retroactive Interpretation
Sufficient to Override the Canons of Statutory
Construction
The two canons of statutory interpretation discussed
above would have been very strong, if not determinative,
arguments in favor of the respondent's position in Matter of
A-A-. Thus, to support the BIA's position, extremely convinc-
ing evidence of legislative intent to retroactively bar 212(c)
relief to aliens convicted of ADAA aggravated felonies should
have been required. Even in the absence of those statutory
canons, the BIA's analysis of the relevant statutes was weak,
and certainly does not withstand scrutiny in light of the full
range of relevant considerations.
The bulk of analysis undertaken by the BIA in Matter of
A-A- to determine whether the respondent was barred from
seeking 212(c) relief evaluated the temporal applicability of
the aggravated felony definition to a murder conviction
(which applies equally to the other ADAA aggravated felo-
nies).' 97 The BIA's analysis relied largely upon the fact that
in order to attach, three of the ADAA disabling provisions re-
quire action on the part of, or aid rendered to, aggravated
felons.19 8 Therefore, the BIA reasoned that the definition
must be given retrospective application, or it is nearly impos-
sible that these provisions would apply to anyone on the date
of enactment of the ADAA.199 In other words, it is almost im-
possible that an alien would be convicted of an aggravated
felony and would be caught committing another prohibited
act on the first day of ADAA's effectiveness, thereby mandat-
ing that the definition be read to attach retroactively.
Unfortunately, the BIA failed to explain why it found
Congress intended these provisions to immediately ensnare a
class of aliens from the first day of its effectiveness. 20 0 There
196. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
197. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 5-14 (BIA 1992).
198. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
200. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 6-8.
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is no language in the statute or legislative history indicating
such an intent.2 °1 It is clear, however, that other immigra-
tion statutes enacted in the past did not immediately confer
their benefits on, or exact their punishments from, aliens.
For example, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment
of 1986 (IMFA)20 2 amended the INA to allow for petitions to
grant aliens immediate relative status or preference status in
order to obtain family-based immigrant visas, by reason of a
marriage entered into during exclusion or deportation pro-
ceedings.20 3 This benefit is only available, however, to aliens
who lived outside the United States for two years after the
date of the marriage.20 4 The effective date of the IMFA
stated that "this section shall apply to marriages entered into
on or after the date of enactment of this Act."20 5 Thus, no
alien could be granted immediate relative or preference sta-
tus pursuant to this section on the first date of its enactment.
Even if one were married on the first day of its effectiveness,
the IMFA required a two-year period to pass before conferral
of any Act benefits. Any argument that marriages entered
into two years before enactment of the IMFA qualified for
IMFA's benefits on its first day of effectiveness is ridiculous.
Like the IMFA, the Alien Registration Act of 1940206 did
not immediately exact punishments upon aliens. The Alien
Registration Act required all aliens fourteen years of age or
older, "now or hereafter in the United States," who remain in
the United States for thirty days or longer, and who have not
previously done so, to apply for registration and to be finger-
printed before the expiration of thirty days.20 7 An enforce-
ment provision provided for a fine, imprisonment, or both
for a willful failure to comply with the Act. 20 9 Because the
enforcement provision became effective upon enactment of
201. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 46.
202. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter IMFA].
203. INA, supra note 8, § 1154(g) (originally enacted as the IMFA, supra
note 202, § 5(b), 100 Stat. at 3543).
204. Id.
205. IMFA, supra note 202, § 5(c), 100 Stat. at 3543.
206. The Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
207. The Alien Registration Act of 1940, § 31(a), 54 Stat. at 673-74) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1988)).
208. Id. § 36(a), 54 Stat. at 675 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1988)).
209. Id.
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the Alien Registration Act,210 and because a violation of the
registration requirement could not occur until at least thirty
days after its enactment, the enforcement provision could not
be invoked against anyone on the first day of its
enactment.21 1
As these statutes demonstrate, immigration laws that do
not impose penalties or confer benefits on a class of individu-
als from the first date of effectiveness are not unusual and do
not compel an interpretation requiring retroactive applica-
tion. Thus, an interpretation of the ADAA recognizing pro-
spective application of the aggravated felony definition would
not create an unacceptable anomaly in U.S. immigration law.
With neither a demonstration of congressional intent for the
ADAA provisions to immediately affect a class of aliens, nor a
showing that prospective operation of immigration statutes is
unusual, the BIA's case for retroactivity of the aggravated fel-
ony definition is unconvincing. Accordingly, the delayed ef-
fectiveness of these provisions of the ADAA do not compel ret-
roactive application.
The BIA claimed additional support for its argument by
citing three provisions of the ADAA that restrict their appli-
cation to persons convicted of aggravated felonies on or after
the date of enactment and contrasted these with three provi-
sions applicable to aggravated felons that do not.21 2 The BIA
reasoned that Congress would have been redundant to state
in these former sections that the disability applies to aliens
convicted after enactment of the ADAA if the definition itself
213Aapplied in like manner. A close examination of the ADAA,
however, reveals that the BIA read these provisions too
broadly. These applicability provisions are not intended to
define when an alien becomes an aggravated felon and thus
are not "surplusage"214 in the absence of retroactive interpre-
tation. More precisely, these provisions define when the in-
strumental action of an alien must occur to incur disabilities
pursuant to the ADAA. For example, section 7344 of the
210. Id. § 38(b), 54 Stat. at 676.
211. In fact, while § 38(b) became effective upon enactment of the Alien Re-
gistration Act, § 31 did not become effective until sixty days after its enactment.
Id. Thus, § 38(b) could not have applied to anyone until ninety days after its
enactment.
212. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 8-10 (BIA 1992).
213. Id. at 10.
214. Id. at 9-10.
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ADAA renders aliens convicted of aggravated felonies deport-
able;215 such conviction must occur after enactment of the
ADAA for this provision to apply. Likewise, section 7345 of
the ADAA enhanced the criminal penalties for premature en-
try after deportation for aliens convicted of aggravated felo-
nies; such reentry must occur on or after enactment of the
ADAA for this provision to apply.216
Thus, each provision of the ADAA providing new or en-
hanced disabilities for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies
requires a prohibited action after enactment of the ADAA.
This pattern is indicative of an explicit intent to limit the ap-
plication of the ADAA disabilities to post-enactment behavior
rather than implicit legislative intent to instrument retro-
spective application of a separate, definitional section of the
ADAA.
The BIA also argued that "had Congress intended to give
the definitional provision of section 7342 of [the ADAA] a...
prospective application, it clearly knew how to do so."217
Given the BIA's feigned ignorance of the traditional assump-
tion of prospective application of legislation, this statement is
not surprising. It is, however, surprising when one considers
that the BIA also directly examined subsequent legislation
amending the INA that did contain explicit directives for ret-
roactive application.218 For example, sections 505(b) and
515(b) of the IA90 and sections 306(a)(11)(B) and 306(a)(13)
of the MTINA include provisions relating to aggravated
felons that apply to "convictions entered before, on, or after"
the date of enactment. 21 9 These statutes provide direct evi-
dence that when Congress intends to give retroactive applica-
tion to immigration statutes, it does so with explicit language
indicating its desire. If one combines this evidence with the
assumption that statutes are to have prospective application
unless expressly stated otherwise, it is clear that had Con-
gress intended retroactive application of the aggravated fel-
215. ADAA, supra note 7, § 7344(b), 102 Stat. at 4471.
216. Id.
217. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 10 (BIA 1992).
218. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
219. See IA90, supra note 10, § 505(b), § 515(b)(2), 104 Stat. at 5050, 5053.
See also MTINA, supra note 86, § 306(a)(13), 105 Stat. at 1751, 1752. In fact,
the MTINA uses language indicative of retroactive intent attaching a disability
to murder convictions "regardless of the date of conviction." Id. § 306(a)(7), 105
Stat. at 1751.
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ony definition, it would have chosen a method more direct
than the BIA's obscure manner of implication.
The BIA noted subsequent legislation on other points to
support its interpretation of the temporal applicability of the
ADAA, but these arguments are no more convincing than any
of its others. The BIA observed that the IA90 was more ex-
plicit in the applicability of IA90 aggravated felonies, 220 im-
plying that since the ADAA was not as explicit, retroactive
application must have been intended. 221 The BIA offered,
however, no rational basis for believing Congress intended to
treat the ADAA aggravated felonies retrospectively, while
treating certain IA90 aggravated felonies prospectively. This
disparity just as easily strengthens the conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend retroactive application for the ADAA ag-
gravated felonies. The IA90, unlike the ADAA, contained a
great deal of legislative history indicating extreme concern
over the problem of criminal aliens.222 One must ask why
Congress allegedly chose to limit itself to prospective applica-
tion of the definition regarding many of the most serious IA90
aggravated felonies when recently enacting legislation (i.e.,
the ADAA) with a comprehensive retroactive effect. In the
absence of any express indication to the contrary, it makes
more sense to interpret the ADAA and the IA90 consistently,
presuming prospective application of their provisions unless
explicitly stating otherwise. With no explanation as to why
Congress allegedly decided to treat these two classes of ag-
gravated felonies differently, this line of reasoning is uncon-
vincing evidence of an intent to apply the aggravated felony
definition retroactively to ADAA aggravated felonies.
Secondly, the BIA noted that in the IA90 "the temporally
unlimited language of the original [aggravated felony] defini-
tion . . .was left alone,"223 implying Congress would have
amended the ADAA definition of aggravated felony to apply
prospectively in the IA90 if it intended this. Because the
INS,224 the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 22 5 and
220. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176 at 12-13.
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 56-58, 61 and accompanying text.
223. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 13 (BIA 1992).
224. The only published interim regulation concerning the ADAA at this
time included a rule for dealing with the enhanced ban for aggravated felons on
re-entry after deportation, and provided for application to aggravated felons
convicted after the enactment of the ADAA (November 18, 1988). 55 Fed. Reg.
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many immigration practitioners 226 were interpreting the
ADAA definition to apply prospectively at the time of the
Amendment, Congress, however, had little reason to change
it. All concerned parties were interpreting the definition pro-
spectively at the time the IA90 was enacted. Thus, it appears
the BIA believed Congress' failure to amend the temporal ap-
plicability of the aggravated felony definition, in the face of
interpretations contrary to its own, indicated a legislative ef-
fort to correct these "misinterpretations." This clearly makes
no sense and also fails to support the BIA's analysis.
Thus, even in the absence of the two strong interpretive
traditions discussed above, the temporal applicability of the
aggravated felony definition is ambiguous at best. The BIA
did not make a convincing argument that the absence of a
statement of temporal applicability compels retroactive appli-
cation of the aggravated felony definition. Even if one as-
sumes that the aggravated felony definition can be attached
24859 (June 19, 1990). This conflicts with the interpretations of the INS and
the BIA at the time of the Matter of A-A- decision. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176
at 7-8. Such contradictory interpretation of a statute by the administrative
agency also weakens the potential argument that the agency's interpretation is
entitled to substantial deference. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446 n.30 (1987); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981). Courts have
expressed willingness to overcome this deference in questions of statutory inter-
pretation that do not require case-by-case adjudication of a standard. See, e.g.,
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448; Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 945 F.2d 288, 294 (9th
Cir. 1991). Even the Supreme Court's strongest case for deference to agency
interpretation is distinguishable based on the fact that no administrative deter-
mination is worthy of greater scrutiny than deportation, "a sanction which in
severity surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal penalties." Lok v. INS,
548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1977). See also supra note 186 and accompanying text.
Even the most current form of the regulations does not explicitly state
when a conviction must occur. Rather, the regulations state that the enhanced
bar to reentry applies to aliens "convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in
section 101(a)(43) of [INA]." 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 (1992). Similar language is em-
ployed throughout the regulations regarding disabilities for aggravated felons.
225. In a recent case, although the respondent had been convicted of at-
tempted murder, and in spite of the protests of the INS that the alien had been
sentenced to more than five years in prison, "the respondent's request for a
waiver under Section 212(c) [was] denied in the exercise of discretion." Matter
of Caba-Caba, A-37-160-071 at 9 (September 23, 1991, unpublished decision).
Unfortunately, the decision does not explicitly state that the respondent had
served five years of his sentence at the time of the hearing. Therefore, it is
possible that he was found eligible because he had not "served" five years, as
required to bar aggravated felons in section 212(c). See Matter of Ramirez-
Samosa, Int. Dec. 3185 (BIA 1992). However, this seems unlikely, since this
rule was not formerly stated by the BIA until 1992. Id.
226. See supra note 170.
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retroactively, it does not necessarily follow that the ban to
212(c) relief contained in section 511 of the IA90 applies in a
like manner. In terms of temporal applicability, section 511
states it will "apply to admissions occurring after the date of
enactment of this Act."227 The BIA noted in Matter of A-A-
that "[n]either [the IA90] nor [the MTINA], however, speci-
fied when a conviction must occur to be classified as an aggra-
vated felony for purposes of this statutory bar."228 Thus,
without an explicit statement indicating to which convictions
this disability attaches, section 511 is temporally ambiguous
regarding which convictions are saddled with the statutory
bar. The BIA offered no justification for its interpretation
that section 511 requires retroactive application to aliens
convicted of ADAA aggravated felonies, merely stating that
"it is our position ... that as the aggravated felony definition
applies retroactively ... [section 511] is properly read as ap-
plying to all convictions deemed within the original aggra-
vated felony definition.. ." so long as they were filed after the
effective date of A90.229 When, however, one considers that
the IA90, as amended by the MTINA, includes four sections
employing explicit language to indicate retroactive applica-
tion,23 ° it is difficult to imagine Congress intended the sort of
retroactive application-by-omission advocated by the BIA.
When the traditions of assuming prospective application of
statutes and interpreting deportation statutes in favor of
aliens are added to the equation, the BIA's interpretation of
section 511 becomes untenable.
IV. PROPOSAL
A satisfactory resolution of the BIA's misinterpretation
of the statutory framework implicated in Matter of A-A- is im-
portant for two reasons. First, while one may question the
wisdom of refusing to judge the merits of every alien's case
for discretionary relief from deportation, Congress clearly
chose to do so in cases regarding aliens recently convicted of
227. IA90, supra note 10, § 511, 104 Stat. at 5052.
228. Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176, at 17 (BIA 1992).
229. Id.
230. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The relevant MTINA amend-
ments were effective as if originally included in the IA90. MTINA, supra note
86, § 301, 105 Stat. at 1759.
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aggravated felonies.23 ' In contrast, it has not done so regard-
ing past aggravated felony convictions. 232 In undertaking to
eliminate these appeals for discretionary relief without clear
statutory authority, the BIA has foreclosed a remedy to indi-
viduals truly warranting relief: aliens who have stayed out of
trouble for years since their last conviction for a deportable
offense.233 The courts have long recognized that deportation
can be a particularly harsh measure.234 Yet the BIA's cur-
rent interpretation of the aggravated felony definition and
section 212(c) allows the INS to reach back to convictions en-
tered years ago and deport aliens without an opportunity for
consideration of the degree to which they may have reformed
since that time. In the absence of clear statutory authority
for such an interpretation, this is precisely the sort of arbi-
trary application of the immigration laws that the courts
sought to avoid using the statutory canons described
above.235
Second, the BIA's refusal to acknowledge judicial and ad-
ministrative precedents in the respondent's favor clearly can-
not go unchecked. The immigration law is full of confusion
for immigrants and immigration attorneys alike,236 and the
immigration judges and BIA are on the front lines of the ad-
judication process. Relevant precedents should not be arbi-
trarily recognized in one case and ignored in the next,237 and
231. See ADAA, supra note 7, IA90 supra note 10.
232. See Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176 at 6.
233. A recent case on point is that of Sal Castiglia. Mr. Castiglia emigrated
with his parents from Italy more than 34 years ago when he was eight years
old. See Fernando Quintero, Deportation is Put on Hold for Third Time, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 18, 1992, at B1. A Vietnam veteran, Mr. Castiglia
became a drug addict while overseas and carried his drug habit back home
when he returned from service. Id. Convicted of murder in 1973 and heroin
trafficking in 1984, Mr. Castiglia has been free since 1988. While holding a full-
time job to help maintain his family, Mr. Castiglia's supporters say he has be-
come an inspiration to the community through his work, counseling and speak-
ing to groups of veterans, children, and substance abusers. Id. See also E. A.
Torriero, INS to Deport Altruistic Ex-Con, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, April 15,
1992, at B1. Under the BIA's current interpretation of the aggravated felony
definition and section 212(c), an individual such as Mr. Castiglia who now seeks
to avoid deportation would not be allowed to present evidence of his rehabilita-
tion and value to the community, no matter how long ago he was last convicted
of a crime.
234. See supra text accompanying note 186.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 172-96.
236. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., supra notes 173-80, 193 and accompanying text.
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appeal to a federal circuit court of appeals should not be re-
quired to guarantee their application to any particular case.
Lack of recognition of these principles is not only unfair to the
individual involved but also wastes time by requiring appeal
to effectuate judgments based on the full range of relevant
considerations.238
This comment proposes resolution of the dispute over the
temporal applicability of section 511 of the IA90 through leg-
islative action. Although it is generally understood that leg-
islation is presumed to have prospective application,239 the
history of this dispute indicates that Congress must explicitly
state that the ban to section 212(c) relief for aggravated
felons applies only to convictions entered after enactment of
the IA90 in order to ensure its application in such a man-
ner.240 Thus, Congress should amend the "effective date"
provision of section 511 to read:
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE
- The amendment made by subsection
(a) shall apply to admissions occurring after the enact-
ment of this Act and shall apply to convictions occurring
after the enactment of this Act.
An amendment to the aggravated felony definition is not
the best solution for two reasons. First, an amendment to the
"aggravated felony" definition contained in the ADAA would
still leave an ambiguity regarding the application of the IA90
section 511 to convictions entered on or after enactment of
238. Recent interpretations of the aggravated felony definition and INA,
however, make it unlikely that most aggravated felons will have the opportu-
nity to appeal such decisions. INA § 106(a)(3) provides for an automatic stay of
deportation in cases where an alien appeals a deportation order to a federal
court of appeals. INA, supra note 8, § 1105(a)(3) (1992). The IA90 eliminated
the automatic stay for aggravated felons for petitions filed on or after January
29, 1990. IA90, supra note 10, § 513, 104 Stat. at 5052. However, the MTINA
clarified the temporal applicability of § 513, stating that it applies "to convic-
tions entered before, on, or after such date." MTINA, supra note 86,
§ 306(a)(11)(B), 105 Stat. at 1751. The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits both ruled that these amendments to the INA should be read as
barring the automatic stay of deportation to aggravated felons regardless of the
date of conviction. See Ignacio v. INS, 955 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1992); Arthurs v.
INS, 959 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1992). The court may still grant a stay in its discre-
tion. INA, supra note 8, § 106(a)(3) (1992). However, it appears unlikely the
court will do so in the absence of compelling circumstances. See, e.g., Ignacio,
955 F.2d at 298-99.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
240. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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the ADAA but before enactment of the IA90.241 Second, and
perhaps most importantly, this comment has focused on the
subject of 212(c) relief for aliens convicted of the ADAA ag-
gravated felonies prior to enactment of the ADAA.242 As
demonstrated above, the label of aggravated felon saddles an
alien with a host of disabilities.2 43 An alteration of the date
of applicability of the aggravated felony definition would have
effects on other sections of immigration law that this com-
ment has not attempted to evaluate. While an all-encom-
passing amendment is a possibility, such a proposal goes be-
yond the scope of this comment. The amendment to the IA90
section 511 as proposed will adequately resolve the issue of
212(c) relief for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies prior
to enactment of the ADAA and the IA90 without altering the
relation of the aggravated felony definition to other issues of
immigration law.
In the absence of legislative action on this issue, this
comment proposes that the BIA, or any higher judicial au-
thority reviewing a BIA decision, reevaluate the issue
presented in Matter of A-A- to include the full range of rele-
vant considerations.2 44
V. CONCLUSION
This comment reviews the legal issue of whether aliens
convicted of the ADAA aggravated felonies prior to the enact-
ment of the ADAA who have served five years in prison are
eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportability pursuant to
section 212(c) of the INA. The BIA concluded that such aliens
are not eligible for 212(c) relief. Two important traditions,
however, in statutory interpretation ignored by the BIA
weigh heavily in the alien's favor. The BIA's arguments in
favor of a contrary interpretation are not convincing to over-
ride these strong traditions. To remedy this situation, Con-
gress should amend the INA to clearly indicate the availabil-
ity of 212(c) relief for such aliens. In the absence of
legislative action, the BIA or any higher judicial authority
241. See supra text accompanying notes 139-57.
242. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 168-230 and accompanying text.
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should review the decision in Matter of A-A-, taking into ac-
count the full range of relevant considerations.
Brian N. Hayes

